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Abstract
With the recent development of the European debt crisis, traditional index bond
management has been severely called into question. We focus here on the risk issues
raised by the classical market-capitalization weighting scheme. We propose an approach
to properly measure sovereign credit risk in a fixed-income portfolio. For that, we
assume that CDS spreads follow a SABR process and we derive a sovereign credit risk
measure based on CDS spreads and duration of portfolio bonds. We then consider
two alternative weighting methods which are fundamental indexation and risk-based
indexation. Fundamental indexation is based on GDP indexation whereas risk-based
indexation uses a risk budgeting approach based on our sovereign credit risk measure.
We then compare all these methods in terms of risk, diversification and performance.
We show that the risk budgeting approach is the most appropriate scheme to manage
sovereign credit risk in bond portfolios and gives very appealing results with respect to
active management of bond portfolios.
Keywords: Sovereign credit risk, credit spread, convex risk measure, sabr model, CDS,
bond indices, fundamental indexation, risk-based indexation, risk budgeting.
JEL classification: G11, C58, C60, H63.
1 Introduction
The impact of the European debt crisis may be huge. From an economic point of view, we
know that economic growth, inflation and foreign exchanges are and will be highly affected
for a long time. Today, there is a lot of uncertainty about the economic and fiscal policies
that Europe and the rest of the world will adopt. Some risk scenarios are more plausible than
others, but nobody knows what the final outcome will be. From a financial investment point
∗This paper is an extended version of the article “Managing Sovereign Credit Risk ” published in Journal
of Indexes Europe.
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of view, the European crisis questions investment policies of pension funds, institutionals
and even retail investors. For example, there is a big issue on strategic asset allocation and
long-term investment policy, because the allocation between asset classes depends on two
economic pillars, namely the output and the inflation (Eychenne et al., 2011). A stagnation
risk scenario will then not produce the same results as an inflation risk scenario in terms of
the equity/bond asset mix decision.
Another consequence of the the European debt crisis is its impact on bond portfolio
management. Indeed, pension funds and institutionals are massively invested in bonds,
and in particular sovereign bonds. For a long time, sovereign bonds of developed countries
have been considered a safe asset. This is especially true since the creation of the eurozone
and European investors have largely diversified their portfolios by investing in non-domestic
bonds since 2000. The stability of the eurozone over the last decade explains this phe-
nomenon: a European investor could prefer Italian bonds to German bonds, because they
offered a better return for a risk increment which was considered to be negligible. Until
recently, bond management in the eurozone was then principally explained by the search of
spread. This style of active management has been encouraged by the industry of passive
management with benchmarks and indexes based on debt weightings. But the eurozone
crisis and the rediscovery of the sovereign credit risk leads to rethink the management of
bond portfolios by giving a better place to risk management.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we define precisely the sovereign risk
and explain why country risk is so specific with respect to other risks. In section three, we
give some insight about the properties of a good sovereign credit risk measure. It allows
to define a risk measure which is consistent from a theoretical point of view and which
could be used in practice for bond portfolios. We then apply this risk measure to analyse
market-cap weighted bond indexes. In section four, we consider how fundamental indexation
and risk-based indexation could correct the drawbacks of market-capitalization indexation
with regard to our sovereign credit risk measure. Section five presents a comparative anal-
ysis between the three indexation schemes (debt-capitalization, fundamental and risk-based
indexations). Finally, section six offers some concluding remarks.
2 Rediscovering sovereign credit risk
In August 2011 Standard and Poor’s downgraded the credit rating of US government debt
from AAA for the first time. Even five years ago, such an event would have seemed very
unlikely; historically, the debt of major developed countries has been considered almost
free of credit risk. However, the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting global recession
has played havoc with this conception. Sovereign issuers’ creditworthiness is now under
increasing scrutiny, especially in Europe, while bond investors now face a significant new
challenge, one that’s especially important for those using a passive, index-based approach.
2.1 The country risk
Sovereign default risk has a long history. Recent debt crises, such as those in 1982 (Mexico
and Latin America), 1997-1998 (Russia and Asia) or 2001 (Argentina and Turkey), have been
concentrated on emerging markets. Nevertheless, it’s been many decades since a “developed”
country defaulted. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), there have been at least 250
sovereign external defaults and 68 defaults on domestic public debt since 1800.
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Generally, country risk encompasses three types of risk covering financial economic crises
(e.g. the 2008 subprime crisis), external debt defaults (e.g. the 1997 Russian default) and
banking system (e.g. the 1990 Swedish crisis). One thing these crises have in common is
that they generally occur in highly leveraged economies. Kindleberger (1939, 1978) has
extensively studied these crises and observes that they show the same patterns. It starts
with a period of overenthusiasm followed by a period of loss of confidence. The crisis is
then triggered by credit rationing and its impact on the business cycle. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) have called these patterns the “syndrome of this-time-is-different”:
The essence of this-time-is-different syndrome is simple. It is rooted in the firmly
held belief that financial crises are things that happen to other people
in other countries at other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now.
We are doing things better, we are smarter, we have learned from past mistakes.
The old rules of valuation no longer apply. The current boom, unlike the many
booms that preceded catastrophic collapses in the past (even in our country),
is built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovations,
and good policy. Or so the story goes [...] Unfortunately, a highly leveraged
economy can unwittingly be sitting with its back at the edge of a financial cliff
for many years before chance and circumstance provoke a crisis of confidence
that pushes it off.
One of the problems with a sovereign crisis is that the time to recovery may be very long
compared to a crisis caused by a pure financial bubble (e.g. the dot.com episode) or by
corporate defaults. The main reason is that a firm or an economic sector can deleverage
quickly, but not a country. Another problem is the contagion effect. Wyplosz (1999) argues
that the market is not perfect and the failures of the market produce multiple equilibria
(bad/good). In this context, contagion may appear naturally even if fundamentals of the
economy are good. In the end, the main problem of sovereign crises is that the economic
cost may be huge1.
2.2 The eurozone crisis: a debt crisis or a Euro crisis?
The eurozone crisis finds its roots in the US subprime crisis in 2007-2008. After the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the fear of “the return of depres-
sion economics” (Krugman, 2009), European countries have largely participated to the G20
global spending plan. One of these Keynesian stimulus consequences is that European debt
has dramatically increased during the period 2009-2011. In Figure 1, we have represented the
evolution of the eurozone debt market value2. In two years, from November 2008 to Novem-
ber 2010, the debt market value increased by 38%. This is larger than the 33% increase
which took place during the preceding nine years, between January 2000 and November
2008.
Another factor which explains the eurozone crisis is the status of Greece. In October
2009, Prime Minister George Papandreou warns that the finances of his country are in a
“state of emergency”. In April 2010, Greece sovereign debt rating is cut to BB+. In May
2010, Greece receives a first bailout from EU and IMF. However, this plan is not sufficient
and a new bailout is decided in July 2011. With the case of Greece, EU has shown its lack
1Argentina (55% of GDP, 1980-82), Japan (10% of GDP, 1990s), Chile (41% of GDP, 1981-87), Israel
(30% of GDP, 1977-83), United States (3% of GDP, 1980s), Sweden (10% of GDP, 1990-93), etc. (Crockett
1997, Wyplosz 1999).
2We have estimated the monthly growth rate of the European debt by using a cubic spline exponential
model.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the eurozone debt market value (in MEUR)
Source: Datastream.
of coordination and reaction. However, Wyplosz (1999) argues that hesitations may be a
factor of contagion. The later the decision, the lower the credibility and the greater this
crisis.
The European crisis is not only a crisis of debt sustainability. It is also a crisis of the Euro
currency. In 1961, Mundell develops the theory of optimal currency area which describes
the optimal characteristics for the creation of a currency or a monetary union. To drive an
economic policy and to face a crisis, there are several instruments and ajustement variables
like foreign exchange rates, supply of money, prices/wages or inflation/unemployment trade-
offs. If a monetary union is created, it loses the control over foreign exchange rates. In this
case, an external balance deficit cannot be compensated by a depreciation of the currency
and will eventually lead to higher unemployment. Because a monetary union could be viewed
as a region where the exchange rate is fixed inside and flexible outside, participants of the
monetary union must share some common principles as explained by Mundell:
If the world can be divided into regions within each of which there is factor
mobility and between which there is factor immobility, then each of these regions
should have a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all other currencies.
This is the idea behind theMaastricht Treaty and the Stability and Convergence Programmes
(SCP). They lay down the common rules applicable to the European countries in order to
ensure the convergence of fiscal and economic policies. However, most of these common
rules are not respected. In some sense, the Eurozone crisis is not only a debt crisis, but also
the crisis of the Euro.
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2.3 Sovereign credit risk in bond indices
Traditionally, bond indices have been constructed according to the methodology of weighting
by market capitalisation. This means that each country in the index is given a weight
proportional to its level of outstanding debt3. The simplicity of this approach and the
recognition of a capitalisation-weighted index as the “market portfolio” has contributed to
the success of the methodology. Yet, intuitively, it is easy to note a basic flaw in this
allocation scheme, since it gives higher index weightings to the most indebted countries,
regardless of their capacity to service their debt. A country facing financial hardship and
trapped in a debt spiral to remain solvent would see its index weight increase until the
whole mechanism collapses and an exclusion from the index occurs. Depending on the
index, exclusion can be triggered by specific events, such as a downgrade or, in the worst
case, a default.
The case of Greece illustrates this point. Since the beginning of the financial crisis,
Greece has struggled with a high debt and refinancing burden. As the country relied more
and more on borrowing, the weight of Greek debt increased in European bond indices until
the point where Greece was downgraded and excluded from some of the key indices. Passive
investors then had no choice but to sell their distressed bonds into a depressed market,
leading to significant losses. From the perspective of efficient markets theory, such a risk
could be acceptable if it were compensated by an additional return, resulting in similar
risk-adjusted returns from the debt of different countries. However, this does not seem to
be verified in practice, as Robert Arnott has pointed out (2010).
Another approach to bond indexing is to base weightings on fundamental data. The
underlying idea is that weightings should reward those countries with high income, rather
than those with high levels of debt. Toloui (2010) proposes to weight country exposures by
GDP instead of by outstanding debt. This approach has the advantage of addressing some
of the shortcomings of capitalisation-weighted indices:
• it allocates more to less indebted countries;
• it does not have a backward-looking bias, unlike capitalisation-weighted indices (which
reflect past patterns of debt issuance);
• it does not suffer from the “buy high, sell low” problem characteristic of the capitalisation-
weighted approach.
Both these weighting schemes integrate fundamental data in an attempt to allocate more
to countries less likely to default, leading eventually to risk mitigation. Here fundamental
factors are used as basic sovereign risk indicators. More comprehensive indicators could also
be considered4. Brodsky et al. (2011) present the Blackrock Sovereign Risk Index, which is
based on a wide range of fundamental factors, both quantitative and qualitative. Agencies’
credit ratings are certainly the most established type of sovereign risk indicator. These
ratings, although mainly driven by fundamental metrics, as shown by Cantor and Packer
(1996), put a greater emphasis on discretionary analysis. Finally Gray et al. (2007) offer
an alternative to scoring/discretionary models. They adapt Merton’s seminal work (1974)
on corporate credit ratings to derive a sovereign risk indicator for emerging markets. From
a pragmatic standpoint, all these risk indicators have proven to be correlated significantly
3In the rest of the article the terms “capitalisation-based” and “debt-based” are used interchangeably to
refer to such a weighting scheme.
4For example, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) consider not only the absolute level of fundamentals but
also the volatility of fundamentals.
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with the credit default swap (CDS) or yield spreads observed in the markets. Such indicators
could therefore be deemed reliable as inputs for a weighting scheme.
Whichever approach one chooses, measuring sovereign risk is a prerequisite for anyone
running a government bond portfolio. Below, we suggest a theoretical framework for such a
measurement.
3 Measuring the risk of sovereign bond portfolios
The volatility of prices return, a measure traditionally used for equity risk, cannot be applied
to sovereign bonds. Instead of measuring the specific risk of a sovereign country, volatility
will also reflect global movements in interest rate yield curves. Even if we consider a portfolio
of sovereign bonds following a single yield curve, the constituent bonds will react differently
to interest rate movements, due to their differing sensitivities (duration and convexity). For
instance, low duration bonds will consistently display lower volatilities than longer duration
bonds, regardless of their credit risk. The same conclusion applies when price returns are
used to measure bonds’ co-movements through a computation of correlations. As our interest
lies in discriminating among countries on the basis of their credit risk, and not on issue-
specific features, we must turn to other risk measures.
In Table 1, we have reported some popular measures of country risk. The first one is the
rating given by credit rating agencies like Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service
or Fitch Ratings. The second one corresponds to the measure computed by Euromoney
whereas the third one is the opacity score developed by the Milken Institute. All these three
measures are very interesting, but are difficult to use to define a risk measure. For example,
the last two measures do not measure exactly the default of sovereign debt. Ratings are
better for that, but there is inertia in revising these ratings. Moreover, there are some
evidence that rating movements lag market-based indicators (Di Cesare, 2006). In Table
1, we have also reported the CDS spreads of several countries for September 1st, 2011 and
October 4th, 2011. For example, the downgrades of Spain and Italy during the first two
weeks of October seem to be anticipated by the CDS market.
3.1 Defining the risk measure
The use of a coherent convex risk measure is important. We consider a portfolio of n assets
and we denote by xi the weight of the ith asset in the portfolio. Let R (x1, . . . , xn) be the
risk measure which depends on the portfolio weights x = (x1, . . . , xn). We say that R is a
coherent convex risk measure if it satisfies this mathematical property:
R (x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
xi · ∂R (x1, . . . , xn)
∂ xi
This property is called the Euler decomposition of the risk measure. It means that the risk
of the portfolio may be decomposed as a sum of the weights times the marginal risks. In
this case, we may define exactly what the risk contribution of each asset is:
RCi = xi · ∂R (x1, . . . , xn)
∂ xi
Working with convex risk measures simplifies the risk analysis of the portfolio, because we
may attribute to each asset its contribution to the global portfolio risk.
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Bond prices may not be directly used for our purpose, but yields derived from them
might. When compared with a reference risk-free rate at corresponding maturities, yield
spreads act as an incremental return, compensating the investor for the risk associated with
the issuer. Ceteris paribus, the higher the yield spread, the higher the credit risk. Unlike
price returns, this measure does not depend on a bond’s duration or convexity. However,
it is not obvious what reference rate should be used or which maturity should be chosen.
An alternative to using bond yield spreads is to use CDS spreads, which exempt us from
selecting a reference rate for each issue under study5. CDS spreads correspond to the value
investors are willing to pay to insure against an issuer’s default risk. CDS spreads therefore
allow us to isolate the sovereign credit risk of an issue, regardless of its currency, yield curve
or maturity6.
3.2 Modelling the dynamics of the spreads
Let Si (t) be the spread of the ith country. We assume that it follows the following diffusion
SABR process (Hagan et al., 2002):
dSi (t) = σSi · Si (t)βi · dWi (t)
Using historical observations of spreads we can calibrate the parameters σSi and βi by the
log-likelihood function. Here we consider the CDS spreads of the eleven European coun-
tries belonging to the Citigroup European Government Bond Index (EGBI) since January
2008. We obtain values for βi close to one7. For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the
spreads follow a lognormal diffusion in the rest of the article. This implies that spreads vary
proportionally to their absolute levels. This assumption seems reasonable in view of CDS
spread data over the last few years. Moreover the credit risk component of bond volatility
is thus proportional to its spread8. It can be estimated as the product of its duration Di,
the spread volatility σSi and the spread level Si (t):
σBi = Di · σSi · Si (t)
Finally we model state-dependence, defining Γ as the correlation matrix of the Brownian
motionsWi (t). Therefore, Γ can be estimated by computing the empirical correlation matrix
of the relative variations of historical spreads. The credit risk of a portfolio of n sovereign
bonds is then defined as the volatility of the CDS basket which would perfectly hedge the
sovereign risk of the portfolio:
R (x) =
√
x>Σx
where Σi,j = Γi,j ·σBi ·σBj is the the covariance between the bond of country i and the bond
of country j and x is the vector of country weights.
5One drawback of this measure is that the CDS market is less liquid than the bonds market. Perhaps a
better measure may be the asset swap spread, but it implies some calibration issues. For the purpose of this
paper, the use of CDS spreads is sufficient to illustrate our methodology.
6This approach is frequently used by recent studies on this subject (Longstaff et al., 2007, Ejsing and
Lemke, 2011).
7Results are given in Appendix A.1. We obtain an average value of 0.957 if we consider the 11 countries.
8Let Bi (t,Di) be a zero-coupon risky bond of maturity (or duration) Di. We have:
d lnBi (t,Di) = −Di · dR (t)−Di · dSi (t)
with R (t) the “risk-free” interest rate.
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3.3 Some stylized facts
In Tables 2, 3 and 4, we report the estimated values of the σSi and Γi,j parameters for the
11 member countries of the euro for different dates. In September 2011, we notice that the
spread volatilities σSi seem to fluctuate around 60%, ranging from 53% to 70% and cross-
correlations tend to cluster around 65%. We also remark that Finland, which is the country
with the lowest level of debt, relative to the size of its economy, is the least correlated with
the other markets. At the opposite end of the scale, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, four
of the most heavily indebted European countries, exhibit a high level of correlation between
each other. This could confirm the intuition that contagion would be more likely to spread
among such indebted countries, whereas countries such as Finland would be less susceptible
to the default of other Eurozone countries. Comparing these estimates to those from three
years earlier, we obtain different results for volatility and correlation. In July 2008, the
spread volatility fluctuated between 58% and 107%, with an average of 77%. This is due to
the log-normality model property of the spread process: the smaller the spreads, the larger
the (relative) volatility. As for the correlations, we notice a sharp increase. The average
correlation rose from 38% in January 2008 to 62% in September 2011. In Figure 2, we have
reported the evolution of the Γ matrix. We observe some interesting facts. First, the default
of Lehman Brothers has shifted the average correlation. It is particularly obvious for the
safe countries like Finland, Germany and Netherlands. Second, we also observe that the
correlation between GIIPS reaches its maximum in October 2010, and decreases since this
date. Third, the correlation between safe countries (Finland, Germany and Netherlands)
has increased recently illustrating a period of flight-to-quality.
Figure 2: Evolution of the Γ matrix
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Table 2: Statistics of σSi
Austria 66.9% 105.8% 77.8% 45.9% 54.4%
Belgium 73.3% 88.9% 78.0% 57.2% 65.8%
Finland 106.8% 97.9% 75.2% 49.8% 55.7%
France 78.2% 91.8% 97.7% 57.3% 63.9%
Germany 81.3% 98.5% 74.9% 48.8% 55.7%
Greece 67.5% 65.8% 94.7% 49.4% 56.8%
Ireland 80.3% 99.8% 73.4% 51.7% 53.5%
Italy 58.8% 69.5% 89.3% 61.5% 69.3%
Netherlands 95.2% 103.7% 68.6% 47.3% 54.9%
Portugal 66.9% 72.0% 116.6% 53.5% 58.3%
Spain 72.4% 76.8% 90.2% 58.9% 64.6%
July-08 July-09 July-10 July-11 September-11Country
Table 3: Estimated Γ matrix (January 2008)
Austria 100%
Belgium 54% 100%
Finland 27% 34% 100%
France 55% 60% 42% 100%
Germany 51% 43% 23% 50% 100%
Greece 42% 38% 29% 47% 43% 100%
Ireland 33% 35% 41% 37% 27% 22% 100%
Italy 47% 50% 37% 60% 47% 61% 35% 100%
Netherlands 22% 38% 32% 29% 17% 4% 29% 22% 100%
Portugal 38% 48% 23% 45% 45% 58% 29% 58% 12% 100%
Spain 35% 49% 22% 33% 33% 35% 28% 41% 30% 41% 100%
Country AT BE FI FR ESDE GR IE IT NL PT
Table 4: Estimated Γ matrix (September 2011)
Austria 100%
Belgium 75% 100%
Finland 68% 64% 100%
France 72% 70% 61% 100%
Germany 77% 72% 65% 72% 100%
Greece 38% 48% 35% 37% 37% 100%
Ireland 58% 62% 55% 56% 59% 54% 100%
Italy 71% 85% 66% 67% 69% 48% 68% 100%
Netherlands 69% 67% 72% 67% 78% 45% 56% 68% 100%
Portugal 55% 66% 50% 55% 57% 54% 80% 73% 52% 100%
Spain 67% 76% 56% 60% 61% 49% 69% 80% 56% 71% 100%
PT ESDE GR IE IT NLCountry AT BE FI FR
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3.4 Application to the EGBI portfolio
Once these parameters are estimated, we can deduce for any sovereign bond portfolio the
credit risk contribution of each country’s debt. Using the previous formula to define R (x),
we are able to compute the marginal credit-linked volatility and risk contribution, country
by country9. The marginal risk expresses the impact of a small change in a country’s index
weight on the credit-linked volatility, whereas the risk contribution reflects the portion of
the overall credit-linked volatility that a particular country is accountable for.
Let us consider the Citigroup EGBI index. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the credit
risk contribution (RC) of each country since the beginning of 2008. We notice the increase
of Greece’s risk contribution since 2008. On April 27th 2010, the country’s sovereign debt
rating was cut to BB+ by Standard & Poor’s. Therefore Greece lost its investment grade
status and exited the EGBI index at its next rebalancing date. The risk contribution of
Greece reached a maximum of 28.5% on April 30th, 2010, while at the end of June 2010,
just before its exit from the index, it remained very high, at 26%. Since July 2010, we also
notice an increase in the credit risk of Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Figure 3: Evolution of risk contributions for the EGBI index
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Belgium
Austria
0%
10%
20%
30%
Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11
In Table 5 we report the weights and risk contributions for the constituents of the EGBI
on some rebalancing dates. In July 2010 (after the exclusion of Greece) the Portugal, Ireland,
Italy and Spain account for 35% of the index weights, but 70% of the sovereign risk. In July
2011, these figures remain approximately the same10. The risk contribution of these four
9See Appendix A.2 for details.
10The weights decrease by 1% whereas the risk contributions increase by 3%.
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Table 5: Weights and risk contributions of the EGBI index
Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC
Austria 4.1% 1.7% 3.6% 7.7% 4.1% 2.3% 4.3% 1.5% 4.3% 1.8%
Belgium 6.2% 6.1% 6.5% 5.1% 6.3% 5.7% 6.4% 6.5% 6.4% 6.7%
Finland 1.2% 0.4% 1.3% 0.5% 1.3% 0.2% 1.6% 0.2% 1.6% 0.3%
France 20.5% 9.8% 20.4% 13.2% 22.2% 15.1% 23.1% 13.3% 23.1% 15.5%
Germany 24.4% 6.1% 22.3% 13.0% 22.9% 6.0% 22.1% 5.3% 22.1% 5.5%
Greece 4.9% 11.4% 5.4% 8.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Ireland 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 4.3% 2.1% 3.3% 1.4% 5.4% 1.4% 2.7%
Italy 22.1% 45.2% 22.4% 29.5% 23.4% 38.7% 23.1% 38.5% 23.1% 46.3%
Netherlands 5.3% 1.7% 5.3% 4.1% 6.1% 1.6% 6.2% 1.2% 6.2% 1.5%
Portugal 2.4% 3.9% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 6.3% 1.6% 6.6% 1.6% 4.4%
Spain 7.8% 12.4% 9.1% 11.8% 9.6% 20.9% 10.3% 21.3% 10.3% 15.5%
Sovereign
Risk
0.70%
September-11
2.59% 6.12% 4.02% 8.12%
Country
July-11July-10July-09July-08
countries is therefore very high, although smaller than the 83% reached during the peak of
May 2011. By contrast, in February 2009 their collective risk contribution was only 46%11.
4 Implications for the management of bond portfolios
Capitalisation-weighted indices presenting clear drawbacks, we propose an alternative ap-
proach to indexation, based on sovereign risk. Using the framework described previously,
it is possible to decompose the risk of a sovereign bond portfolio into individual country
contributions. Given the portfolio weights, we can find the risk contributions. Risk bud-
geting is basically the same process in reverse. Given a set of defined risk contributions,
risk budgeting provides a portfolio allocation. The problem with traditional indices is that
investors may face a high level of risk concentration. To avoid that, investors can start by
defining a set of risk budgets that they find appropriate and then derive the corresponding
weights. Even if the risk budgets are fixed, the portfolio weights still vary over time as
the risk associated with each country fluctuates. This way, when an individual country’s
situation deteriorates, this is reflected in its spread and thereby its risk, leading eventually
to a reduction of its weight. Risk budgeting thus allows investors to control the distribution
of risk over time. However, it does not address the problem of how to choose the right risk
budgets.
4.1 Fundamental indexation
The GDP weighting approach can help us to define the risk budgets. Toloui (2010) writes:
“An alternative to market-cap weighting is to weight country exposures in global
bond indexes by GDP instead of market capitalisation. [. . . ] In contrast to
market-cap weighting, GDP weighting does not reward countries with high levels
of debt issuance: Countries with higher debt-to-GDP levels generally have a lower
representation in a GDP-weighted index versus a market- cap-weighted index.”
11The decomposition was 5.8% for Greece, 3.0% for Ireland, 27.1% for Italy, 1.9% for Portugal and 8.3%
for Spain.
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Table 6: Weights and risk contributions of the GDP indexation
GDP RC GDP RC GDP RC GDP RC GDP RC
Austria 3.1% 1.4% 3.1% 7.0% 3.1% 1.7% 3.2% 1.0% 3.2% 1.3%
Belgium 3.8% 4.0% 3.8% 3.2% 3.9% 3.3% 4.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Finland 2.0% 0.8% 1.9% 0.7% 2.0% 0.3% 2.1% 0.3% 2.1% 0.3%
France 21.2% 11.2% 21.5% 14.9% 21.4% 13.4% 21.5% 10.6% 21.5% 13.8%
Germany 27.4% 7.6% 27.2% 17.0% 27.7% 6.7% 27.9% 5.8% 27.9% 6.7%
Greece 2.6% 6.2% 2.7% 4.4% 2.6% 15.7% 2.4% 19.8% 2.4% 13.8%
Ireland 2.0% 3.0% 1.9% 5.6% 1.8% 2.6% 1.7% 5.9% 1.7% 3.3%
Italy 17.4% 37.5% 17.3% 23.5% 17.2% 25.8% 17.0% 23.9% 17.0% 32.6%
Netherlands 6.5% 2.5% 6.5% 5.3% 6.5% 1.6% 6.6% 1.2% 6.6% 1.6%
Portugal 1.9% 3.3% 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 5.3% 1.9% 6.7% 1.9% 5.1%
Spain 12.0% 22.6% 12.0% 16.5% 11.8% 23.7% 11.8% 21.4% 11.8% 17.5%
Sovereign
Risk
September-11
0.64% 2.47% 6.59% 4.56% 8.26%
Country
July-08 July-09 July-10 July-11
In our opinion, the GDP weighting approach is a first step towards avoiding the “buy high,
sell low” problem of capitalisation weighting. A direct extension of this approach is to
consider the GDP-RB (risk budgeting) weighting approach. In this case, the weights are
computed such that the risk contribution of each country is proportional to its GDP. Using
GDP as the basis for a risk budget allows us to consider GDP weighting schemes as a
special case of GDP-RB weighting approach (in other words, GDP weighting implies that
all countries present the same risk levels and correlations).
Let us now consider the eleven national sub-indices of the Citigroup EGBI index. Each
sub-index can be seen as a proxy of the relevant country’s outstanding debt and will be
treated as if it were a bond. A GDP weighting approach consists in fixing at each rebalancing
date the weight of the ith country in the portfolio as equal to the share of its GDP in the
total GDP of the Eurozone:
xi =
GDPi∑11
j=1GDPj
In Table 6 and Figure 4 we use a GDP weighting scheme12. Under GDP-based indexation
Greece has a smaller index allocation than under capitalisation weighting. For example,
in July 2008, the weight of Greece was 4.91% by market capitalisation (Table 5) but only
2.61% under GDP-based indexation (Table 6). We observe the same phenomenon for Italy
and Portugal. Nevertheless, we notice that this type of indexation increases the weight of
Spain or Ireland. This is because the debt to GDP ratio is lower than average for these
countries. We remark that GDP indexation produces a more balanced portfolio in terms of
risk than debt-based indexation, but that risk is still concentrated in a few countries.
Another disappointing result is that GDP indexation produces sovereign credit risk mea-
sures similar to those of DEBT indexation. For example, the sovereign risk measure is equal
to 8.26% for the GDP indexation in September 2011 which is close to the 8.12% obtained
with the EGBI portfolio.
12The GDP column may also be viewed as the weights of the bond portfolio.
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Figure 4: Evolution of risk contributions for the GDP indexation
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4.2 Risk-based indexation
Risk-based indexation is more difficult to define for bond portfolios than for equity portfolios.
For the later, a lot of allocation methods exist and are adapted to define a risk-based
portfolio13. These methods, however, are not suited for bond portfolios14 except for the risk
budgeting techniques that prove appropriate.
4.2.1 An introduction to risk budgeting allocation methods
The risk budgeting method is explained in Meucci (2005) and Sherer (2007). This technique
makes it possible to control the risk allocated to each constituents of a portfolio. Let x =
(x1, . . . , xn) be the portfolio weights. If we use a coherent convex risk measureR (x1, . . . , xn),
we have :
R (x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
RCi (x1, . . . , xn)
where RCi (x1, . . . , xn) is the risk contribution of the ith asset :
RCi (x1, . . . , xn) = xi · ∂R (x1, . . . , xn)
∂ xi
13We can cite for example the equally-weighted portfolio (DeMiguel et al., 2009), the minimum variance
portfolio (Clarke et al., 2006), the erc portfolio (Maillard et al., 2010) or the mdp/msr portfolio (Choueifaty
and Coignard, 2008 and Martellini, 2008).
14Moreover, some of these methods face some concentration problems (Roncalli, 2011). For example, if
we consider the minimum variance portfolio, we will obtained a very concentrated portfolio in Finland and
Germany.
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Table 7: Comparison of traditional and risk budgeting approaches
Absolute Relative
1 60.00% 18.80% 11.28% 66.67%
2 20.00% 23.94% 4.79% 28.30%
3 20.00% 4.26% 0.85% 5.03%
Volatility 16.92%
Absolute Relative
1 48.50% 17.69% 8.58% 60.00%
2 13.17% 21.71% 2.86% 20.00%
3 38.32% 7.46% 2.86% 20.00%
Volatility 14.30%
Traditional approach
Risk budgeting approach
Asset
Risk Contribution
Asset Weight
Marginal 
Risk
Risk Contribution
Weight
Marginal 
Risk
To define a risk budgeting (or RB) portfolio, we consider a set of given risk budgets
{RB1, . . . ,RBn}. Then we have to solve the following non-linear system of n equations15:
RC1 (x1, . . . , xn) = RB1
...
RCn (x1, . . . , xn) = RBn
Remark 1 The philosophy of the risk budgeting approach is then the opposite of the tradi-
tional approach. In the traditional approach, the weights of the portfolio are given and we
determine the risk contributions according to these weights. Conversely, in the risk budget-
ing approach, the risk contributions of the portfolio are given and we determine the weights
according to these risk contributions. To illustrate these differences, we consider three as-
sets. The volatilities are respectively 20%, 30% and 15%. The correlations are 60% between
the first asset and the second asset and 10% between the first two assets and the third asset.
We assume that the risk measure is the volatility of the portfolio. In Table 7, we report the
volatility decomposition of the portfolio with weights 60%, 20% and 20%. We notice that
the third asset has a weight contribution of 20% but a risk contribution of only 5%. If we
now consider a portfolio such that the risk budgets are 60%, 20% and 20%, the weights are
48.5%, 13.2% and 38.3%. This means that we must set the third asset weight to 38.3% if we
want it to account for 20% of the portfolio risk.
4.2.2 The GDP-RB indexation
For the GDP-RB approach, we have to estimate the vector of weights such that the risk
contribution of the ith country is equal to the part of its GDP in the total GDP of the
Eurozone:
RCi =
GDPi∑11
j=1GDPj
The solution is shown in Figure 5 and in Table 8. By construction, the risk contributions
of GDP-RB indexation correspond to the weights of GDP indexation. For example, in
July 2008, Austria had a 3.1% weight in the GDP indexed portfolio, the same as its 3.1%
15The numerical solution may be obtained by using non-linear optimisation procedures like the sequential
quadratic programming (SQP) algorithm.
15
Managing Sovereign Credit Risk in Bond Portfolios
Figure 5: Evolution of weights of the GDP-RB indexation
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Table 8: Weights and risk contributions of the GDP-RB indexation
RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights
Austria 3.1% 3.9% 3.1% 1.2% 3.1% 2.9% 3.2% 4.2% 3.2% 3.8%
Belgium 3.8% 2.1% 3.8% 4.1% 3.9% 2.2% 4.0% 1.9% 4.0% 2.0%
Finland 2.0% 3.2% 1.9% 4.4% 2.0% 6.3% 2.1% 6.0% 2.1% 6.1%
France 21.2% 22.0% 21.5% 25.6% 21.4% 15.5% 21.5% 16.5% 21.5% 15.3%
Germany 27.4% 47.8% 27.2% 35.5% 27.7% 50.0% 27.9% 48.7% 27.9% 50.2%
Greece 2.6% 0.7% 2.7% 1.4% 2.6% 0.2% 2.4% 0.2% 2.4% 0.3%
Ireland 2.0% 0.8% 1.9% 0.6% 1.8% 0.6% 1.7% 0.2% 1.7% 0.5%
Italy 17.4% 5.3% 17.3% 11.2% 17.2% 6.0% 17.0% 5.2% 17.0% 4.7%
Netherlands 6.5% 9.2% 6.5% 6.7% 6.5% 12.8% 6.6% 14.0% 6.6% 12.5%
Portugal 1.9% 0.7% 1.9% 1.6% 1.9% 0.4% 1.9% 0.2% 1.9% 0.4%
Spain 12.0% 4.2% 12.0% 7.7% 11.8% 3.1% 11.8% 2.9% 11.8% 4.2%
Sovereign
Risk
September-11
0.39% 2.10% 3.25% 1.91% 4.13%
Country
July-08 July-09 July-10 July-11
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Figure 6: Evolution of weights of the DEBT-RB indexation
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risk contribution in the portfolio based on GDP-RB indexation. In Table 8, we clearly see
the impact of the sovereign credit risk of individual countries. For example, the weight
of Germany is lower under GDP indexation than under GDP-RB indexation. The same
phenomenon appears for other “safe” countries like Finland or the Netherlands. We also
notice that the portfolio structure varies a lot across time, depending on the sovereign risk
priced in by the market. The GDP-RB portfolio is further away from the GDP portfolio in
periods of risk aversion, such as July 2011, whereas it is closer when sovereign risk concerns
are relatively low, as in July 2009. Moreover, we notice that the GDP-RB indexation has a
lower sovereign risk measure compared to DEBT or GDP indexations. For example, at the
1st September 2011, it is equal to 4.13% for the GDP-RB indexation whereas it is equal to
8.12% and 8.26% for the DEBT or GDP indexations.
4.2.3 The DEBT-RB indexation
This methodology may be applied to other metrics than GDP. For example, if we consider
the amount of debt (DEBT), the portfolio is built such that:
RCi =
DEBTi∑11
j=1DEBTj
This case is illustrated in Figure 6 and Table 9. One interesting property of the risk budgeting
approach is that when sovereign risk is the same for all countries, the solution corresponds to
the weights of the traditional benchmark. In the case of the DEBT-RB approach, assuming
equal risks gives us the weights of the capitalisation-weighting scheme (i.e. the DEBT-
weighting scheme).
17
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Table 9: Weights and risk contributions of the DEBT-RB indexation
RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights RC Weights
Austria 4.1% 5.4% 3.6% 1.4% 3.9% 3.9% 4.2% 5.9% 4.2% 5.5%
Belgium 6.2% 3.6% 6.5% 7.1% 6.0% 3.8% 6.2% 3.2% 6.2% 3.4%
Finland 1.2% 2.0% 1.3% 3.1% 1.2% 4.4% 1.5% 4.8% 1.5% 5.0%
France 20.5% 22.4% 20.4% 25.5% 21.2% 17.2% 22.5% 18.9% 22.5% 17.7%
Germany 24.4% 45.8% 22.3% 30.9% 21.9% 45.0% 21.5% 42.1% 21.5% 43.9%
Greece 4.9% 1.4% 5.4% 2.9% 4.3% 0.4% 2.6% 0.2% 2.5% 0.3%
Ireland 1.0% 0.4% 1.5% 0.5% 2.0% 0.8% 1.4% 0.2% 1.4% 0.4%
Italy 22.1% 6.9% 22.4% 14.8% 22.4% 8.5% 22.5% 7.4% 22.5% 6.7%
Netherlands 5.3% 8.2% 5.3% 5.8% 5.9% 12.8% 6.0% 14.3% 6.0% 12.7%
Portugal 2.4% 0.9% 2.3% 2.0% 2.0% 0.4% 1.6% 0.2% 1.6% 0.4%
Spain 7.8% 3.0% 9.1% 6.0% 9.2% 2.7% 10.1% 2.7% 10.1% 4.0%
Sovereign
Risk
0.41% 2.19% 3.63% 2.10% 4.57%
Country
July-08 July-09 July-10 July-11 September-11
5 Comparison of the indexing schemes
We may now simulate the four indexing approaches: DEBT-weighting, GDP-weighting,
GDP-based risk budgeting and DEBT-based risk budgeting16. In what follows, we compare
all these weighting schemes in terms of performance, risk and portfolio characteristics.
5.1 In terms of performance
The results are given in Figure 7 and relevant statistics are shown in Table 10. We notice
that alternative index approaches to capitalisation weighting post better performances. We
notice that risk-based indexations yield the best returns but generate higher tracking errors.
Of course, these results depend on the study period and may be explained by the economic
situation since 2008.
Table 10: Main statistics (01/01/2008 – 06/09/2011)
DEBT GDP GDP-RB DEBT-RB DEBT* DEBT*-RB
Average Return 4.7% 5.2% 6.8% 6.5% 4.8% 6.6%
Volatility 4.4% 4.3% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4%
Sharpe 1.05 1.19 1.53 1.49 1.10 1.50
Tracking Error 0.6% 2.2% 2.0% 0.3% 2.0%
Information Ratio 0.84 0.91 0.90 0.55 0.91
Correlation 99.2% 87.4% 89.7% 99.8% 89.6%
Beta 97.1% 87.5% 88.8% 98.9% 88.7%
16In the DEBT∗ case, we have excluded Greece since July 2010 in order to be coherent with the construc-
tion of the EGBI portfolio.
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Figure 7: Simulation of the performance of the 4 indexing schemes
5.2 In terms of risk
Our purpose here is not to say that alternative indexations are better than capitalisation
weighting. Having said that, the fact that only alternative methodologies can integrate a
sovereign risk dimension is an undeniable asset17. In the risk budgeting approaches, it is
easy to see how it is implemented and what benefits can be expected. Evolution of the
sovereign risk measure is reported in Figure 8 for the 4 indexation schemes. As expected,
we find that risk-based indexations present lower sovereign risk. If we compare the risk
contribution of GIIPS countries, we observe a difference between risk-based indexation on
the one hand, and capitalisation and fundamental indexation on the other hand (see Figure
9).
5.3 In terms of portfolio characteristics
In Table 11, we report the weights and risk contributions and some other statistics like
yield-to-maturity, duration and average spread as at the beginning of September 2011. We
also compute the concentration measure given by the Gini index. This statistic takes the
value 1 in case of perfect concentration and 0 if no concentration exists. The Gini coefficient
is applied both to weights and to risk contributions. When considering weights, the less
concentrated portfolio (with a Gini index equal to 0) corresponds to the equally weighted
portfolio, whereas the less concentrated portfolio in terms of risk corresponds to the equal risk
contributions (ERC) portfolio (Maillard et al., 2010). In both cases, the most concentrated
17In some sense, GDP, GDP-RB and DEBT-RB may be viewed as the equivalent for bonds of the existing
schemes of fundamental and risk-based indexation for equities (Demey et al., 2010).
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Figure 8: Evolution of the risk measure for the 4 indexing schemes
Figure 9: Evolution of the GIIPS risk contribution
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portfolio corresponds to a portfolio invested in only one country’s debt. We observe in Table
11 that risk-based index approaches may lead to more concentrated portfolios in terms of
weights. However the concentration in terms of risk is decreased when compared to debt-
based (capitalisation) weighting. One of the main advantages of the risk budgeting approach
comes from its dynamic allocation process, one which adapts to prevailing sovereign risk.
By integrating the sovereign risk dimension in the investment process, indices based on risk
budgeting also fit the definition of risk-based portfolios (Demey et al., 2010).
5.4 With respect to active management
In Figure 10, we report the NAV of the 218 funds available in the Morningstar database
under the “Bond Euro Government” category. We also report the different performance
quantiles (10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90%) of these funds. We observe a high dispersion of
performance between the top 10% and the bottom 10%.
Many studies agree that on average mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks by
a statistically and economically significant margin18. It is particularly true for the equity
asset class, but it is less verified for the bond asset class. In our example, if we accept
the academic rule that the average performance of active management (represented by the
quantile 50%)) is equal to the performance of the benchmark (represented by the DEBT
indexation) minus the fees, we obtain an implied fees ratio equal to 36 bps per year. This
academic rule seems to be verified. It is interesting to notice that risk-based indexations
favorably compare with the top 10% best funds of active management.
Figure 10: Comparison of bond indexes with active management
18See Hereil et al. (2010) for a survey.
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6 Conclusion
In this article, we present a useful framework to analyze the sovereign risk of a bond portfolio.
By defining the credit risk of a bond portfolio as the volatility of the CDS basket which
would perfectly hedge the sovereign risk of the portfolio, we can compute the sovereign risk
contribution of each country and monitor it across time. Using this decomposition, we show
that indexation based on risk budgeting techniques may be an efficient alternative to the
traditional capitalisation-based approach to indexation. We also show that fundamental
indexation is not enough and must be supplemented by risk-based methods.
We focus here on portfolios of sovereign bonds and on credit risk. However, this ap-
proach may be easily extended to take into account other risks (e.g. interest rates or foreign
exchange) or to be applied to other asset classes (e.g. corporate or high yield bonds). In this
last case, bond indexes based on risk budgeting techniques present an interesting feature
from a Solvency II point of view because they will need less capital requirements compared
to traditional bond indexes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Maximum likelihood of the diffusion process for modeling spreads
We assume that we observe spreads at some known dates t0, . . . , tm. Let Si,j be the observed
spread for the ith country at date tj . The log-likelihood function for the ith country is given
by the following formula:
` = −m
2
ln 2pi −m lnσSi −
1
2
m∑
j=1
ln (tj − tj−1)−
βi
m∑
j=1
lnSi,j−1 − 12
m∑
j=1
(Si,j − Si,j−1)2(
σSi S
βi
i,j−1
)2
We estimate the coefficient βi by maximizing the concentrated log-likelihood function. Fig-
ure 10 shows the maximum likelihood estimation of βi for the period January 2008-August
2011.
Table 12: Results for the period January 2008 – August 2011
Country AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES Average
estimate 0.996 1.017 0.816 0.786 0.899 1.070 0.836 1.157 0.793 1.013 1.148 0.957
std-dev. 1.10% 2.00% 1.60% 1.60% 2.00% 1.10% 0.70% 1.70% 0.90% 1.10% 2.10% 1.45%
A.2 Risk decomposition of the volatility risk measure
We consider a portfolio x = (x1, . . . , xn) of n assets. Let Σ be the covariance matrix of
assets. The volatility of the portfolio is then equal to:
σ (x) =
√
x>Σx
We deduce that the marginal volatility is:
∂ σ (x)
∂ x
=
Σx√
x>Σx
We define the risk contribution as the product of the weight times the marginal volatility:
RCi = xi · ∂ σ (x)
∂ xi
= xi · (Σx)i√
x>Σx
We verify that the sum of risk contributions is exactly equal to the volatility risk measure:
m∑
i=1
RCi =
m∑
i=1
xi · (Σx)i√
x>Σx
= x>
Σx√
x>Σx
=
√
x>Σx
= σ (x)
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